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Introduction 
After perceiving decay in the quality of their products, A Large Engineering Company 
(ALEC) sought to understand the reasons behind it. Adopting a systemic approach to analyzing 
the structure and dynamics of the organization was proposed. System dynamics, a novel 
methodology that relies on feedback loops, causal link, and stocks and flows, clearly is an 
appropriate tool for shedding light and stimulating insight, from a holistic point of view, on the 
dynamics that may have caused the quality decay.  The model illustrates ALEC’s workforce 
supply chain and how its structure affects the production’s quality.   
This paper presents the steps that WPI and ALEC undertook in this project. After 
identifying the problem at hand, we explain our reasoning behind why we chose the System 
Dynamics methodology, describe structure and the process of building of the model, show the 
results of our simulations, and explore possible policies to remedy the quality decay. 
Recommendations are made about what are some of the measures that ALEC can take to 
improve the change of quality over time. Finally, given that our model makes some limiting 
assumptions about the realities of the organizational dynamics at ALEC, we discuss how to 
elaborate the model for further research. 
 
 
Methodology 
The decision to use System Dynamics as a methodology for the project was not made by 
our team, but instead was proposed by our contact with A Large Engineering Company (ALEC). 
Our contact had some experience with the System Dynamics graduate program at WPI, and was 
interested in applying the methodology to the address quality issues at ALEC. To understand this 
decision, one must look into the previous attempts by ALEC to identify and control long term 
quality control issues. Many of ALEC's efforts were driven by a more statistics based approach. 
Six Sigma has a strong place in the organization, and has demonstrably proven results, but fails 
to address the “big picture”, and is incapable of processing qualitative feedback. System 
Dynamics complements Six Sigma well, and is able to address some of the areas that Six Sigma 
is not associated with. 
 
 The modeling process is capable of considering qualitative information as links in the 
model. This is both a strength and a weakness of the System Dynamics approach. By 
incorporating these links, the model is able to include important feedback from employees that is 
unable to be used in a statistics driven approach. These unquantifiable links, however, detach the 
model from the numerical results that it might produce. A model such as the one we created can 
only be used to suggest trends or compare policies, but will not be able to predict the numerical 
changes that might result from a given change. That is to say, our model might be able to 
produce the result “Policy P1 will have a stronger positive effect on Stock S1 than Policy P2,” 
but would be unable to create a result such as “Policy P3 will increase Stock S2 by 15% over 3 
years.” The strength of a qualitative approach is rooted in the nature of modeling, and is the 
result of being able to explore the effect of different loops within the model. Complex behavior 
can be traced to relatively simple structures, and oftentimes it becomes clear where the leverage 
points in a system are during the modeling process. System Dynamics promotes a more holistic 
understanding of cause and effect in the model, and allows the user to target areas which will 
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amplify a potentially positive result. This understanding of the nature of the system allows for 
the creation of rules that exploit the system for an advantageous result. 
  
 The focus on qualitative links offered a challenge. We were working with an engineering 
group at the organization, and most were very hesitant to accept a qualitative approach to the 
problem. Many struggled to understand the role that data plays in a System Dynamics model, or 
that links might be added to the model that were not directly drawn from the available data. 
Engineers are used to working with very concrete problems, tackling a less quantifiable problem 
was seen by the group as an interesting challenge, but led to some amount of hesitancy. 
 
 Another challenge in this project, and a problem with modeling in general, was the 
selection of the boundaries of a model. Through our weekly meetings with ALEC it became clear 
that there were several potential areas for study. These included the employee supply chain 
(which we eventually chose), the work contracts/changing of specifications provided by the 
government, and the union structure. In the final product, many of these are ideas are 
incorporated, yet simple rules guide several of the variables. Our model boundary selection was 
also guided by literature such as Sterman (2000)1 and Saeed (1992)2
 
. In most cases, there is 
room to expand the boundaries of the model to create a more robust product, and this idea will be 
expanded upon in the write-up of areas for future study.  
 
 
Model Building Process 
Our modeling process followed the guidelines laid out by Akkermans in a paper on a 
strategy called Participative Business Modeling, or PBM (1995)3
Recognizing that quality decay in the production has been occurring, ALEC decided to 
attempt utilizing a systemic approach to understand the dynamics behind the undesirable 
behavior. Meeting on a weekly basis with ALEC, we first had to identify the slice of the problem 
we were going to dwell on.  ALEC discussed several areas of concern that may have stimulated 
the quality decay, including the relationship with the Government (specifically demand in 
changes in the product’s specifications), union contract that discourages mentoring new workers, 
or the structure of the workforce supply chain. We ultimately decided to focus on how the 
workforce supply chain, as it is presently established, relates to the average skill and productivity 
of the system, and consequently, to quality behavior. While we will include some of the elements 
that had been identified as possible causes of the quality loss in our model, such as the 
customer’s change in specifications, we will make the workforce supply chain the central 
. Quoting Akkermans: 
“Modeling in PBM moves gradually from very informal, qualitative, and conceptual models to 
more formal, quantitative simulation models.” This chapter details the model-building process, 
starting with the definition of a problem, proceeding with a model conceptualization/brainstorm 
phase, and finally refining the ideas conveyed by the team at ALEC into a concrete model. 
                                                          
1 Sterman, J. 2000. Business Dynamics. Erwin McGraw Hill 
2 Saeed, K. 1992. Slicing a Complex Problem for System Dynamics Modeling. System 
Dynamics Review. 8(3).  
3 Akkermans, H. (1995). Developing a Logistics Strategy through Participative Business 
Modelling. 
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emphasis of our project. 
During our first two meetings, our main emphasis was on creating a reference mode of 
the behavior of the quality over the past several years. Through our discussions, we were 
ultimately able to illustrate their description of the behavior of quality in the following graph, our 
reference mode: 
 
Figure 1.1 -- Reference Mode 
  
 
DESCRIBE REFERENCE MODE HERE IN A FEW SENTENCES 
 
After the “golden age”, a period when quality was high and stable, ALEC entered a phase 
in which quality was decreasing. The intersection of the graph of quality and the “NOW” axis 
illustrates the state of the quality when ALEC contacted us. Their fear was that quality would 
continue decreasing (as depicted by the red graph). Their hope, however, was to understand the 
system, capture the reasons behind the past decrease, and take appropriate action to bring quality 
back to its stable and high state (as depicted by the green graph). 
Our primary task during the first few weeks was to understand as much of the problem 
and of the organization as possible. In other words, we focused on capturing their mental model 
of the dynamics behind the workforce supply chain, and translate it into a system dynamics 
causal loop diagram.  
Figure 1.2 illustrates our preliminary view of the system that we were modeling: 
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Figure 1.2 -- Dynamic Hypothesis 
The causal loop diagram captures the basic dynamics of the workforce supply chain, and 
how they relate to quality.  We begin by assuming that when New Workers are increased, the 
required training time will increase as a result, which in turn increases the fraction of time spent 
on training. Increasing the fraction of time spent on training increases the total expertise in the 
system, which increases quality, decreases total rework, decreases the fraction of time spent 
working, and decreases the fraction of time spent training, hence completing our negative 
feedback loop, but this takes a while. Expertise decreases in the short run when New Workers are 
added in the system, but increases when Senior Workers are increased. Note that there is a  link 
between New Workers and Senior Workers because we assume that with time New Workers 
advance to Senior ranks (hence the dashed lines on the link, which represent a delay). Finally, 
when quality increases, total rework decreases, fraction of time spent working increases, and 
quality increases again, completing our positive feedback loop. Note that we have included an 
exogenous variable, “Complexity of work”, which, when increases, increases the training 
required, and decreases quality.  Moreover, had we initially decreased the amount of new 
workers (or any other variable), the linked variables would have behaved in the opposite 
direction, that is, a decrease would have been an increase and vice versa. 
The next step was to translate the causal loop diagram in to a system dynamics model that 
is built for simulation. The following section discusses the structure of the model. For 
information regarding how we refined some of the details of our model, please refer to the 
meeting minutes. Figure 2.1 shows a high-level map of the model. The model is split into three 
sectors: the Work Sector, the Skill Sector, and the Employee Sector. Employee sector contains 
the employee supply chain and shows how employees are hired and progress through different 
ranks of the organization. The Skill Sector measures the quality of work in the organization by 
looking at the amount of employees at each skill level in the Employee Sector. The Work Sector 
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details work additions, work, rework, and schedule compression. All of these will be elaborated 
on in the following section. 
 
Figure 2.1 -- Sector Relationship Map 
Structure of the Model 
Each sector of the model in figure 2.1 is described below: 
Workforce Supply Chain 
At A Large Engineering Company, the progression of a worker’s status is structured, and 
we assume all workers follow the same path. The employee supply chain was constructed on the 
basis of the interviews with the client and it aggregates several sub-categories of employees into 
the categories considered in the model and shown in Figure 2.2. It loosely resembles the Human 
resource Management Subsystem proposed by Abdel-Hamid/Madnick in their Software Project 
Dynamics book (1991)4
 
. All new hired workers begin as “learners” (our model assumes that 
workers cannot enter the system as experienced workers or designers), at which point there are 
two possible routes to advance to the next position. They can either gain experience through on-
the-job learning and still be considered learners, or they can enter a structured training program 
(usually reserved for the more qualified learners), and be considered apprentices.  The rate of 
entry into the apprenticeship program depends on the amount of learners in the system, and only 
5% (found under the parameter “A Rate” in the model) of the learners become apprentices. After 
graduating from the program, which on average takes a fixed amount of time (5 years in our 
model), Apprentices become Designers. 
                                                          
4 Madnick, S. E., & Abdel-Hamid, T. (1991). Software project dynamics : an integrated approach. 
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The other path that the learner can undertake to be promoted to the Designer position is 
through on-the-job learning. Unlike the apprenticeship program, this path is not structured and its 
duration may vary, as it depends on the fraction of time experienced workers spend training the 
learners. That said, we have developed at parameter “Eff. of Designers”, to account for the 
impact that the time experienced workers spend training the learners has on the learners’ 
promotion rate. “Eff. of Designers” depends on the number of learners in the system, the number 
of designers, and the fraction of time that designers spend training the learners. 
Once learners become designers, their skills and productivities increase, affecting the 
average skill (and consequently quality) and total work done, respectively.  With time and 
experience, designers advance to become either design techs or supervisors. Finally, the design 
techs and supervisors leave the system. While our model does not allow hiring experienced 
workers, all workers can leave the system according to some attrition rate. The attritions rates are 
5% for the learners, 4% for the apprentices, 4% for the designers, and 8.5% for design techs and 
supervisors. 
Further, we developed a variable “New Hires” that will determine the hiring rule, that is, 
the value of the inflow “Hires”. “New Hires” will vary according to the relationships that we will 
set it to depend on, and we will experiment with various methods of hiring new workers. For 
example, the work gap or the attritions rate could determine when to inject new workers into the 
system. Note that the initial values for the stocks of each type of employee have been given to us 
by ALEC.  
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Figure 2.2 -- Employee Sector 
Work Cycle Sector 
The Work Sector, shown in Figure 2.3, is divided into several smaller parts. The core of 
the model is composed of the Work Needed to be Done stock and the Completed Work stock. 
The structure for Work and Rework is based upon the model proposed by Abdel-
Hamid/Madnick in Software Project Dynamics(1991)5
                                                          
5 Madnick, S. E., & Abdel-Hamid, T. (1991). Software project dynamics : an integrated approach. 
95-97. 
. Work is added to Work Needed to be 
Done via the Work Additions flow, which represents the acquisition of contracts. A complexity 
variable accounts for the difficulty of the work, and changes in difficulty over time. Complexity 
modifies work additions proportionally; A complexity of 2 would double the amount of work 
need to complete a contract. Work flows from the Work Needed to be Done Stock to Completed 
Work at a particular rate (Total Work Done).  
Learners Designers Design Techs
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D Promotions
DT AttritionD AttritionL Attrition
Apprentices
A Promotions
A Program
A Attrition
Ef f  of  Designers
D Fr Time
Spent Training
New DT Hires
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Total Work Done is based on many factors, yet remains a simple equation. It is merely a 
summation of the amount of each category of worker multiplied by the fraction of time they 
spend working multiplied by the productivity for each category of worker. Each worker 
contributes a certain amount of work to the system, and the aggregate value is Total Work Done. 
This value is then modified by the effect of the employee supervisor ratio. 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  =  (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐴𝐴_𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊_𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷__𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊  +𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊_𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐷𝐷_𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊_𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷__𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊 +𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷_𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷_𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇_𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊_𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷__𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊 +𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐿𝐿_𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊_𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷__𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊) 
∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸_𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴_𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 
Based on Quality, work may or may not become rework. Rework is divided into two 
components, there is a base rework rate, representing the portion of rework that cannot be 
avoided. This rate does not change, and represents the amount of rework caused by change in 
specifications or other unforeseeable circumstances. The other component of rework varies with 
Quality. As Quality drops, the amount of work that needs to be redone increases proportionally 
to the drop in Quality. 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 =  𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷_𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 + 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊_𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 ∗ (1 − 𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃) 
The last part of the Work Sector is the Schedule Compression Loop. Schedule Gap looks 
at the difference between Work Additions and the current Work Rate, and calculates how much 
extra time would be needed to complete the given work on schedule. As this gap grows, 
employees begin to rush their work. Quality will be lowered, but work rate will be increased as 
the amount of Schedule Compression grows. 
(𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊_𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃_𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷_𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊_𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 )  −  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇_𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 
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Figure 2.3 -- Work Sector 
 
Skill Sector 
The skill sector, shown in Figure 2.4, looks at a weighted average of the skill of all 
employees to determine the level of Quality in the organization at a given time. Each type of 
employee has a different level of skill associated with his/her group. These parameters were 
suggested by the team at ALEC based on their experiences working with members of each 
group. Supervisors are not included in the average, but have a different avenue of affecting 
Quality. The ratio of employees to supervisors is calculated, and as the number of employees per 
supervisor grows, there is a negative impact on Quality. The effect of the Employee supervisor 
ratio is normalized based on a normal employee to supervisor ratio, the function for which is 
shown in Figure 2.5. The graph is S-Shaped with an inflection point at the normal value. 
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Increasing beyond the normal value will have diminishing returns, while any increase from 
below that point will have an increasing effect. While discussing the graph with the employees of 
ALEC, we agreed to assume that the effect of supervision is 25% in either direction. Adequately 
supervised employees are up to 25% more productive, while inadequately supervised employees 
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Figure 2.5 -- Supervisor Graphical Function 
 
Base Run 
In our base run, our hiring rule is a function of the discrepancy between work needed to 
be done and average work done. Average work done (productivity) is a weighted average that 
represents how sum of work that can be done by the workers, divided by the total number of 
employees. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show simulations of the base run. 
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Figure 3.1 -- Base Run 
 
Figure 3.2 -- Base Run Employees 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the changes in work quality over time, and how it varies with the 
hiring process. In the beginning (from t=38 to t~= 52), our system is experiencing the “golden 
age” identified by ALEC, where quality was consistently high. During the beginning of the 
golden age, quality is rising because our apprentices and learners are becoming designers and 
design techs. Note that while the number of designers is decreasing, the proportion of designers 
to apprentices/learners is high. At t~=50, because desired work force is higher than actual 
workforce, our hiring policy is implemented, and thus, an influx of learners is added to the 
system. Consequently, quality decreases. With time, these learners/apprentices become 
designers, and quality rises again, thus completing the cycle. 
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Extreme Value Testing 
No Hires 
If no hires are allowed into the system, Work builds up over time and quality eventually 
decreases. The original growth of quality can be attributed to the fact that most employees will 
become designers or design techs before they leave the company.  
 
Figure 4.1 -- Behavior of  Employees in a test when hiring is stopped 
 
 
Figure 4.2 -- Behavior of Quality in a test when hiring is stopped 
 Without any work in the system, there is no need to hire employees. Employees 
eventually decline to zero as those that started initially in the model leave over time. 
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Figure 4.3 – Behavior of employees with no work additions 
 
Figure 4.4 – Behavior of work with no work additions 
Thus, the results reassure us that the model is robust; the model behaves as it would be 
expected to under these extreme conditions. This is not proof of the validity of the model, but it 
suggests that the model reasonably represents the system. 
 
Policy Experimentation 
Hire Adjustment Time 
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In our first policy experiment, we change the hire adjustment time, which represents the 
number of years it takes to respond to work force discrepancy. This simulation is shown in figure 
5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 -- Hire Adjustment Time 
Lines 1 through 6 in Figure 5.1 represent hire adjustment times of 1 through 6 years respectively. 
Clearly, as the time needed increases, the period of the oscillations and the magnitude of the 
oscillations in quality increases. A low adjustment time is desirable. Having a lower adjustment 
time is better since not only do we note a decreasing periodicity, but also, the magnitude of the 
troughs is lower.   
Hiring people to replace attritions 
In this experiment, we will modify our model such that every time a worker leaves, a new 
worker (i.e. a learner) will be added to compensate for the attrition. Recall that in our base run, 
hiring is based on the work gap only. While Figure 1.1 illustrates the original behavior of the 
system, Figure 5.2 illustrates what happens if we only hire to compensate for the workers who 
leave and do not take into account the work gap. 
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Figure 5.2 -- Hiring for Attrition(Hires/Quality) 
 
Figure 5.3 -- Hiring for Attrition (Employees) 
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Figure 5.4 -- Hiring for Attrition(Quality/Schedule Compression) 
Clearly, eliminating hiring gap for gap removes the cycles in the model, which is desirable. 
However, as is discernable from figure 5.4, schedule compression is the driving force behind the 
work. As work rate is reduced, schedule compression is used to compensate for the gap, and 
quality suffers. Since our total number of workers is constant, and a percentage of our work done 
goes into rework, the total work done will increase. Therefore, in order to compensate for the 
increase in total work (i.e. work + rework), we must compress schedules.  
Hiring for attrition and for work gap 
 Now, in order to remedy the increase in schedule compression, we will set up the model 
such that it includes the hiring rule for both attrition and work gap. As we expected, some 
oscillation occurs, but the system eventually finds equilibrium. In both cases, hiring for attrition 
and hiring for attrition and work gap, equilibrium is eventually found. The latter case has a 
significantly higher equilibrium quality value. Figure 5.5 demonstrates this new rule and shows 
that a higher equilibrium value for quality is attained. 
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Figure 5.5 -- Hiring for Attrition + Work Gap 
Hiring at a Constant Rate 
 Another policy to test is hiring at a fixed rate, regardless of whether or not workload is 
increasing or decreasing. The following graph depicts how quality changes as result over time. 
 
Figure 5.6 -- Constant Hiring Rate (15 Employees per Year) 
  As shown in Figure 5.6, quality increases for a short amount of time, but a relatively low 
equilibrium quality is attained in the long run. This behavior is expected since there is a large 
amount of new workers at the start of the run, and hence, when this group advances in the 
workforce supply chain, quality increases. With time, this initial group that is relatively large 
(because this group of workers that we are tracking consists of our the workers initially in the 
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system as well as a added group of workers at time zero due to constant hiring) will attrite, and 
consequently the proportion of workers in each stock will become stable. Moreover, as we have 
previously established the total work done increases due to rework. Consequently, quality 
decreases, because schedule compression kicks in. Note that this behavior is similar to that of 
hiring for attrition. In fact, hiring for attrition in our model is a type of constant hiring, for, the 
same proportion of workers is leaving the system with time, and thus the hiring rule is constant. 
 Therefore, for a certain value of “constant hiring rate”, the constant hiring rule is 
equivalent to hiring for attrition. However, what would happen to our system’s behavior if we 
changed the magnitude of the constant rate? Let us test our system for various values of constant 
hiring rates. 
To do so, we develop the following comparative graph, shown in Figure 5.7: 
  
Figure 5.7 -- Constant Hiring Rate (1, 10, 15, 20, 25 employees per year) 
Lines 1-5 depict how quality changes when the “constant hiring rate” is 1, 10, 15, 20, and 25 
respectively.  Note that the general behavioral mode of graphs 1, 2 and 3 changes significantly 
from that of graphs 4 and 5. In fact, in graphs 1, 2 and 3, quality first increases, reaches a 
pinnacle, and then decreases to reach a low equilibrium point. On the other hand, graphs 4 and 5 
first decrease, and then reach a high equilibrium point. Note that both 4 and 5 eventually merge 
and experience the same behavior. 
 This behavior is understandable. In graphs 1, 2 and 3, the hiring rule does not provide 
enough workers to complete the work without a compression in schedule, and consequently 
quality decays (as explained previously).  In graphs 4 and 5, due to the initially high number of 
learners, quality decreases. Clearly, quality decays more in 5 than in 4 because our system carries 
a greater number of learners. This decrease is followed by a rise in quality because the initial 
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group of learners has advanced and has become more skilled. The system ultimately reaches 
equilibrium when the initial group leaves the system, and the proportion of skilled to unskilled 
workers does not change.  
 Let us now probe into why graphs 4 and 5 eventually reach the same equilibrium point. 
The answer, quite simply, is that because the amount of work that has to be done is constant, 
only a specific number of workers are required. Our model assumes that having more workers 
than is necessary does not increase quality, for there is only a specific number of workers needed 
to complete the work. Finding this value, which would be the lowest number of workers such 
that the system reaches the high equilibrium point, will optimize our system, because quality will 
decrease the least at first and still achieve the same equilibrium. Furthermore, if our model were 
to be expanded to include the cost and wage of workers, the value of the constant hiring rate will 
be of great importance, and we will still want to choose the lowest number of workers to 
constantly hire such that the reference mode is that of graphs 4 and 5. In our model, we find that 
this value is 20 workers. 
 Given that the work addition rate is constant and that a fraction of work (that depends on 
quality) will go into rework, the total work done will increase over time. For example, if 20 
workers are able to maintain a quality of 0.90, then our rework will be 10 percent of our 
completed work (changes in specifications exist will cause rework whether or not our workers 
are skilled).  If we begin with 100 as a workload, and assume that there are no changes in 
specifications, then rework will increase our total work done to 110. It is important to note that 
when using a constant hiring rule, there must be enough workers to cover both the work, and the 
rework. If there are not enough workers, rework will continue to grow, and quality will begin to 
decay. 
Ramping Work Rate 
 In the previous experiments, it has been assumed that the work inflow rate remains 
constant. That is to say, the company receives new work contracts at a consistent rate. While 
those experiments are valuable in terms of identifying how the system reacts to different hiring 
rules, they are hardly realistic. In this run, it is assumed that the inflow of work ramps up 
periodically. Every 20 years, the company receives an additional unit of work, as can be seen by 
the Work Ramp Function shown in figure 6.1. 
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Constant Hiring With Ramping Work Rate 
 
Figure 5.8 -- Ramping Hiring Graphical Function 
While hiring at a rate of 20 employees per year may have been the optimal solution when 
work was added at a constant rate, there is a severe decay in quality if this policy is applied to a 
ramping rate. This serves to logic, as a constant rate is unable to address the increasing amount 
of work, and has no structure to compensate or add employees to the system to handle the 
additional work. Shown in Figure 5.9 is a trial run with a constant hiring rate and ramping work 
rate. 
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Figure 5.9 -- Ramping Work with Constant Hiring 
 
Ramping Work Rate Without Hire for Attrition (gap only) 
Our base run already has shown that hiring for gap only is a weak strategy, yet applying 
the gap strategy to the ramping work rate shows that it performs drastically worse when applied 
to a situation with a dynamic work rate. Whereas the base run with gap only hiring demonstrated 
sinusoidal behavior with a trough quality of ~.5, a run with ramping work additions expressed a 
similar shape, but with a trough quality of ~.32. This is shown in figure 5.10. 
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Figure 5.10 -- Ramping Hiring  
With Hire for Attrition and Ramping Work Rate 
As with a steady work rate, hiring for attrition serves to eliminate the sinusoidal behavior. 
Quality reaches a plateau, and remains at that level after the system has reached an equilibrium 
where hires=attrition and the amount of employees at each experience level remains constant. 
This run is shown in Figure 5.11.  
 
 
Figure 5.11 -- Ramping Hiring 
Random Work Rate (Normal Distribution with mean 1 and a standard deviation of 0.5) 
We now assume that the work is added randomly, following a normal distribution with 
mean 1 and standard deviation of 0.5. That said, the equation for “Work Addition Rate” is 
NORMAL(1, .5). Then, we implement various hiring rules, and see how quality changes as a 
result. 
Constant Hiring Rate 
We begin by setting up a comparative graph of the quality with various hiring values. We 
get the following graph: 
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Figure 5.12 -- Random Work Rate 
Graphs 1 through 5 depict hiring values of 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, an 25 respectively. 
Eventually, with 20 workers, quality stabilizes, because we are no longer relying on schedule 
compression to get the job done. We note that this behavior is very similar to the system where 
work rate is constant. Since we are most interested in the general behavior, rather than specific 
outputs, we can confidently rely on the same hiring policy as that of the constant work rate when 
confronted with random fluctuations in work rate. 
The following experiment illustrates an important point regarding the dynamics that 
govern a system. As noted previously, the behavior of quality with randomness is generally the 
same as with constant work addition rates. Noise accompanies randomness (because of the 
variance), and one would expect our system to be disturbed. However, quality approaches an 
equilibrium value on the long run, suggesting that the noise has no significant effect on our 
system on the long run. Clearly, the effects of the endogenous dynamics of the system are greater 
than that of the noise. Thus, we witness how significant the structure of a system is in 
determining the nature of the governing dynamics. 
 
Recommendations for future research 
Given that our model is currently making several limiting assumptions, ameliorating the 
model by including the details that we did not take into account due to time constraints is a good 
starting point. Our most fundamental assumption, and that is due to the systemic approach of 
system dynamics, is that the model illustrates the dynamics at hand from an aggregate point of 
view. That said, our model takes into account averages and cannot tell us anything about specific 
cases within the variables and stocks. While, as mentioned, this is a feature of system dynamics, 
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researchers in the future can include the various subcategories within each stock of workers. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the types of workers that fall under each stock. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Employee Aggregate Chart 
 
 Furthermore, our model does not take into account that design techs and apprentices can 
either follow the design or the engineering track. Including the natural progression of workers 
within the subcategories in the workforce supply chain is an area of interest that may reveal 
further insight, and yield new policy space. 
 A second assumption our model makes is that the time an experienced worker spends 
with a leaner does not change and remains the same, because of aggregation. Consequently, the 
sole way to increase the fraction of time spent training new workers is by increasing the number 
of designers. We have assessed that there are two ways to address this assumption: either by 
having supervisors mandate the time as a policy, and hence let it be an exogenous factor, or by 
having internal dynamics determine the level of commitment, and let it be an endogenous factor, 
such as supervisor ratio. Including this assumption in our model may also allow for new policy 
space. For instance, giving incentive for the designers to train the learners will accelerate the new 
workers’ transition from the learner stage to the experienced level, and potentially have a 
desirable impact on quality. 
 A third area of expansion is to model the workers’ ability to handle schedule 
compression. Our model currently considers that there is a general limit on how much schedule 
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compression can increase, however, further research should address in more depth how much 
schedule compression can be utilized as the driving force behind the work done.   
 Another assumption that our model makes is that a decrease in quality does not lead to a 
change in the rate of work additions. However, one may argue that if quality decreases the 
company would lose business because the customer would rely on another service provider. This 
depends largely on the type of market that the company is in, but given that competitors exist, to 
be more complete, our model must include the implications of a decrease in quality with respect 
to the customer’s willingness to contract the company. 
 Furthermore, future work can develop a model that allows hiring of experienced 
personnel, and examine the effect of the policy on quality. It will be crucial to also include how 
feasible such a policy is when applied to the organization. In other words, our model would 
doubtlessly choose to hire experienced workers over learners if hiring the two types of workers 
lead to the same costs for the organization; however, this is not the case, and not only are 
experienced workers harder to find, but their inflow at a certain point in time is most likely less 
than that of new workers.  
 During one of the later meetings with ALEC, the rate of flow for the apprentice program 
was discussed. Currently, 5% of people in the Learner stock become apprentices. A more 
accurate way to describe the apprenticeship program, however, would be to have 30% of all new 
hires go into the apprentice program. Although this change in formulation has very little impact 
on the base run of the model, as is shown in Figures 6.2 through 6.4, More study would be 
needed to figure out the exact implications of changing this rule, and the sensitivity of the 
parameters involved. 
 
Figure 6.2 – Quality graph With 30% apprentice rate 
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Figure 6.3: Quality graph with current apprentice program rate 
 
 
Figure 6.4 – Employee graph with 30% apprentice rate 
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Figure 6.5  – Employee graph with current apprentice program rate 
 
 Finally, modeling the implications of our hiring rule on the company is of significant 
interest and value. We have attempted various hiring rules, and have examined their effect on 
quality. However, any company, ALEC included, would be keenly interested in knowing what 
the costs of the hiring strategy are, and see whether it is economically feasible to implement the 
policy. Modeling the financial implications will be a stepping stone to going from the 
“modeling/simulation world” to the “real-world”, as we study how to effectively implement the 
policies in the company.  Needless to say there are several other implications of the hiring rule, 
and future researches must closely coordinate with ALEC to understand the system more fully, 
and explore additional consequences of the hiring rule. 
Conclusion 
 The base run of our model did not exactly depict our initial reference mode; however, we 
realized that what ALEC perceived as being the behavior of quality was simply part of the larger 
cycle seen in the base run’s simulations. The “golden age” in quality (the period when quality 
was consistently high) was merely the crest of an oscillating system that is due to the structure of 
the organization. As work is added to the system, employees needed to be brought on to handle 
the additional amount of work, which caused decay in quality due to an increase level of 
inexperience in the organization. However, with time, the learners become more advanced, and 
progress in the ranks of the workforce supply chain, to become designers, design techs, and 
supervisors, hence increasing the level of experience in the system, and consequently quality. 
After the experienced people begin to leave, new workers are hired, and quality falls as a result. 
And the cycle repeats, leading to the oscillatory behavior seen in the base run. We have noted 
that the reference mode described by ALEC depicts a part of the oscillations that our simulations 
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have shown. System Dynamics provides us with the advantage of perceiving the long-term 
behavior of the system, whereas the mental models of the ALEC employees solely address the 
short-term picture. 
 Shown in Figure 7.1 is a small section of the base run from time 50 to 60. This section 
depicts the mental model of the employees, which we were able to reproduce. This shows that 
the “golden age” of quality was from time 50 to time 57, at which point quality began to decay. 
Time 60 would approximately correspond to the year 2010. 
 
Figure 7.1 -- Conclusion 
 Our experiments were targeted at dampening the oscillations in the system. Oscillations 
in the system occurred because the hiring inflow occurred in bursts, that is, new workers would 
be injected into the system, in large amounts, after long periods of no hiring. To address this 
issue, the bursts must be smoothened out, and we achieved this by hiring for attrition.  
 In a system where work is added at a constant rate, or follows some kind of normal 
distribution, a linear hiring rate is the preferred rule since it removes the oscillations. Clearly, 
however, the company must assess the strategy to see whether it is financially feasible.  
 In a system where work is added at an increasing rate (ramping work rate), hiring for 
attrition or at a constant rate are no longer beneficial rules, as is previously seen in the 
simulations. To address the new type of work inflow, we have found that combining both rules, 
hiring for attrition and for work gap, is the most beneficial strategy. Implementing this rule in the 
company requires constant and thorough investigation of the necessary amount of workers for a 
given amount of work inflow.  
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 Although this model was designed specifically for ALEC, it can be noted that the 
findings of this model could be applicable to a vast array of organizations whose basic structure 
is similar. This model applies to any organization that must deal with long term contracts 
arriving at an inconsistent rate, with a long training time for employees. 
 We recommend that, if ALEC chooses to further pursue the project, the company 
develops the model to address the limitations of the assumptions listed previously. They can be 
strong starting points for future research. 
  
Appendix 
The Interface 
The goal of the interface was to deliver a product that allowed ALEC to experiment with 
different scenarios while assuming that the user would have little, if any, knowledge of using 
System Dynamics software. To accomplish this goal, the Interface creation tools of iThink were 
used. From the Interface, many parameters can be easily accessed and tweaked. The table under 
the graph gives access to most of the important parameters used by the model. These include the 
initial employees (shown), attrition rates, productivity of each type of employee, skill of each 
type of employee, promotion rates, and the amount of time spent working for each category of 
employee. The goal was to gather all of these important numbers to one location, so that a user 
would not be required to dig through the model. 
Other variables such as Work Addition Rate and Complexity could not be modeled by 
simply changing a parameter. These were added as graphical functions, and can be seen in the 
lower left hand corner. Instead of writing an equation to model these, a user could simple “draw” 
an equation in the box. In Figure 8.1, Work Addition Rate is set to ramp over time. 
The last part of the interface is the Policy Switch Section. This section allows the user to 
turn hiring rules on and off, and allows for the combination of different hiring rules. These 
switches can be used to easily recreate the experiments demonstrated in this paper, and could 
allow for some amount of further exploration. 
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Figure 8.1 -- The Interface 
Equations 
Apprentices(t) = Apprentices(t - dt) + (A_Program - A_Promotions - A_Attrition) * dt 
INIT Apprentices = Initial_Apprentices 
INFLOWS: 
A_Program = A_Rate*Learners 
OUTFLOWS: 
A_Promotions = Apprentices/5 
A_Attrition = A_Attr_Rate*Apprentices 
33 
 
Completed_Work(t) = Completed_Work(t - dt) + (Work_Rate - Rework_Rate) * dt 
INIT Completed_Work = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Work_Rate = Total_Work_Done*(Schedule_Compression) 
OUTFLOWS: 
Rework_Rate = Change_in_Specification+Work_Rate*(1-Quality) 
Designers(t) = Designers(t - dt) + (L_promotions + A_Promotions - D_Promotions - D_Attrition 
- D_to_S_Promotions) * dt 
INIT Designers = Initial_Designers 
INFLOWS: 
L_promotions = (Learners/8.5)*Eff_of_Designers 
A_Promotions = Apprentices/5 
OUTFLOWS: 
D_Promotions = New_DT_Hires 
D_Attrition = D_Attr_Rate*Designers 
D_to_S_Promotions = Supervisor_Fr*Designers 
Design_Techs(t) = Design_Techs(t - dt) + (D_Promotions - DT_Attrition) * dt 
INIT Design_Techs = Initial_Design_Techs 
INFLOWS: 
D_Promotions = New_DT_Hires 
OUTFLOWS: 
DT_Attrition = DT_Attr_Rate*Design_Techs 
Learners(t) = Learners(t - dt) + (Hires - L_promotions - L_Attrition - A_Program) * dt 
INIT Learners = Initial_Learners 
INFLOWS: 
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Hires = New_Hires 
OUTFLOWS: 
L_promotions = (Learners/8.5)*Eff_of_Designers 
L_Attrition = L_Attr_Rate*Learners 
A_Program = A_Rate*Learners 
Schedule_Compression(t) = Schedule_Compression(t - dt) + (Chg_in_SC) * dt 
INIT Schedule_Compression = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Chg_in_SC = (Eff_of_Schedule_Gap-Schedule_Compression)/Time_to_change_SC 
Supervisors(t) = Supervisors(t - dt) + (D_to_S_Promotions - S_Attrition) * dt 
INIT Supervisors = Initial_Supervisors 
INFLOWS: 
D_to_S_Promotions = Supervisor_Fr*Designers 
OUTFLOWS: 
S_Attrition = S_Attr_Rate*Supervisors 
Work_Needed_to_be_Done(t) = Work_Needed_to_be_Done(t - dt) + (Rework_Rate + 
Work_Additions - Work_Rate) * dt 
INIT Work_Needed_to_be_Done = Normal_Work 
INFLOWS: 
Rework_Rate = Change_in_Specification+Work_Rate*(1-Quality) 
Work_Additions = Work_Addition_Rate*Normal_Work*Complexity 
OUTFLOWS: 
Work_Rate = Total_Work_Done*(Schedule_Compression) 
Apprentice_Productivity = 0.6 
Avg_Skill = 
(A_Skill*Apprentices*A_Fr_Time__Working+Designers*D_Skill*D_Fr_Time__Working+Desi
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gn_Techs*DT_Skill*D_Fr_Time__Working+L_Skill*Learners*L_Fr_Time__Working)/(Appre
ntices*A_Fr_Time__Working+Designers*D_Fr_Time__Working+Design_Techs*DT_Fr_Time
__Working+Learners*L_Fr_Time__Working) * Eff_of_Emp_Sup_Ratio 
Avg_Work_Done = Total_Work_Done/Total_Employees*0+1 
A_Attr_Rate = 0.04 
A_Fr_Time__Working = 0.60 
A_Rate = .05 
A_Skill = .4 
Change_in_Specification = .1 
Constant_Hires = 0 
Constant_Hires_Rate = 1 
Designer_Productivity = 1 
Design_Techs_Productivity = 1.2 
Desired_Project_Time = 1 
Desired_Workforce = (Work_Needed_to_be_Done)/Avg_Work_Done 
DT_Attr_Rate = 0.085 
DT_Fr_Time__Working = 0.90 
DT_Skill = 1.2 
D_Attr_Rate = 0.04 
D_Fr_Time_Spent_Training = .4 
D_Fr_Time__Working = 0.60 
D_Skill = 1 
Eff_of_Designers = (0*Designers*Learners+1)*D_Fr_Time_Spent_Training 
Emp_Sup_Ratio = Total_Employees/Supervisors 
Hire_Adjustment_Time = 2 
Hire_for_Attrition = 0 
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Hire_for_Gap = 1 
Initial_Apprentices = 29 
Initial_Designers = 177 
Initial_Design_Techs = 14 
Initial_Learners = 66 
Initial_Supervisors = 20 
Learners_Productivity = 0.4 
L_Attr_Rate = .05 
L_Fr_Time__Working = 0.75 
L_Skill = .3 
New_DT_Hires = .05 
New_Hires = MAX((Desired_Workforce-Total_Employees)/Hire_Adjustment_Time, 
0)*Hire_for_Gap+ 
(A_Attrition+DT_Attrition+D_Attrition+L_Attrition+S_Attrition)*Hire_for_Attrition+ 
Constant_Hires_Rate*Constant_Hires 
Normal_Emp_Sup_Ratio = 15 
Normal_Work = 154 
Quality = Avg_Skill*(2/(1+Schedule_Compression)) 
Schedule_Gap = (Work_Needed_to_be_Done/Work_Rate) - Desired_Project_Time 
Supervisor_Fr = .025 
S_Attr_Rate = 0.085 
Time_to_change_SC = 6 
Total_Employees = Apprentices+Designers+Design_Techs+Learners 
Total_Work_Done = 
(Apprentices*Apprentice_Productivity*A_Fr_Time__Working+Designers*Designer_Productivit
y*D_Fr_Time__Working+Design_Techs*Design_Techs_Productivity*DT_Fr_Time__Working
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+Learners*Learners_Productivity*L_Fr_Time__Working)*Eff_of_Emp_Sup_Ratio 
 
Complexity = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 1.00), (10.9, 1.00), (20.8, 1.00), (30.7, 1.00), (40.6, 1.00), (50.5, 1.00), (60.4, 1.00), (70.3, 
1.00), (80.2, 1.00), (90.1, 1.00), (100, 1.00) 
Eff_of_Emp_Sup_Ratio = GRAPH(Normal_Emp_Sup_Ratio/Emp_Sup_Ratio) 
(0.00, 0.76), (0.2, 0.765), (0.4, 0.782), (0.6, 0.823), (0.8, 0.905), (1.00, 1.00), (1.20, 1.06), (1.40, 
1.11), (1.60, 1.15), (1.80, 1.19), (2.00, 1.22), (2.20, 1.24), (2.40, 1.25), (2.60, 1.25), (2.80, 1.25), 
(3.00, 1.25) 
Eff_of_Schedule_Gap = GRAPH(Schedule_Gap) 
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.11), (2.00, 1.19), (3.00, 1.29), (4.00, 1.41), (5.00, 1.50), (6.00, 1.60), (7.00, 
1.70), (8.00, 1.79), (9.00, 1.90), (10.0, 1.99) 
Work_Addition_Rate = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 1.00), (10.9, 1.00), (20.8, 1.00), (30.7, 1.00), (40.6, 1.00), (50.5, 1.00), (60.4, 1.00), (70.3, 
1.00), (80.2, 1.00), (90.1, 1.00), (100, 1.00) 
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